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 OPTIMIZING LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE 






This research analyzes the optimal and most cost-efficient stationing of critical ship parts 
that will directly support Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) ships deployed and stationed 
in Europe.  The goal is to inform and recommend to decision-makers where and how 
many critical parts should be staged to best support the operational readiness of BMD 
ships on European Phased Adaptive Approach missions.  To effectively accomplish this 
task, the research analyzes eight high-demand, high-dollar value spares that are forward-
staged in Sigonella, Italy.  Through modeling and simulation, we determine the most 
effective method to optimize ship readiness in a cost-constrained environment.   
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 I. PURPOSE 
A. PROBLEM 
As part of President Barack Obama’s European Phased Adaptive Approach 
(EPAA), the United States Navy will forward deploy AEGIS ballistic missile defense 
(BMD) destroyers and cruisers to support the defense of Europe.  Beginning in 2014, the 
Navy will forward deploy two AEGIS destroyers to Rota, Spain, followed by two more in 
2015.  The AEGIS weapon system deployed on destroyers and cruisers is a vital element 
of the missile defense shield that protects Europe, but the system requires regular 
maintenance and replacement parts.  In an operationally demanding environment, ships 
need ready access to replacement parts, yet the cost of these parts must be balanced with 
the current fiscally constrained environment.  However, BMD ships stationed in Sixth 
Fleet and the Mediterranean Sea face a number of short- and long-term constraints and 
challenges. 
Operating in the Mediterranean Sea presents many unique challenges to deployed 
ships.  Sixth Fleet and operational units must overcome the “last tactical mile,” which 
incorporates the transfer of parts and supplies from shore-based warehouses or facilities 
to ships underway or in port.  Since the end of the Cold War and President Obama’s 
strategic pivot to the Pacific area of responsibility (AOR), the number of Navy assets 
stationed and deployed in Sixth Fleet has decreased, making it more difficult to transfer 
critical parts from shore to ship.  Additionally, BMD destroyers and cruisers usually 
deploy independent of a carrier strike group or expeditionary strike group, reducing the 
logistics network available in the Mediterranean Sea.  
The largest hurdle to overcome the last tactical mile is the limitation of shore- and 
sea-based helicopters and aircraft to transfer critical parts and supplies from shore-based 
supply centers to ships conducting BMD operations at sea.  Flight I and II Arleigh Burke-
class destroyers do not have the capability to deploy with organic helicopters but can 
receive and refuel helicopters. 
 1 
 Additionally, carrier strike groups and expeditionary strike groups, which 
normally transit the Mediterranean Sea en route to Fifth Fleet, do not operate regularly in 
Sixth Fleet and cannot contribute helicopters to assist in logistics operations.  Two 
helicopters operate out of Naval Air Station Sigonella, but these helicopters are limited 
by their range so they cannot always deliver parts to BMD ships underway in the eastern 
Mediterranean Sea.  To compensate for the range limitation, military logistics aircraft 
located at Naval Air Station Sigonella transfer parts between logistics hubs to decrease 
the last tactical mile. 
Finally, long-term demand for AEGIS and BMD replacement parts will grow 
because the Navy intends to increase the number of its BMD-capable ships from 28 to 41.  
Furthermore, the addition of two AEGIS Ashore sites in Poland in 2015 and Romania in 
2018 will increase the demand for BMD-related parts.  The logistics community will be 
challenged to ensure that all BMD-capable assets have the required spare parts to support 
mission requirements in a fiscally constrained environment. 
B. ORGANIZATION 
In a mission area where the costs of failure can be catastrophic, BMD ships 
deployed in Sixth Fleet must have access to the spare parts and materials required to 
fulfill their mission.  This report analyzes BMD readiness issues unique to Sixth Fleet in 
order to inform decision-makers and recommend to them where and how many critical 
parts should be staged to best support the operational readiness of BMD ships on EPAA 
missions. 
Chapter II provides background on the BMD mission in Europe, the Iranian 
threat, and the AEGIS weapon system (AWS), and it also presents a brief discussion of 
the Arleigh Burke–class destroyers that will be stationed in Rota, Spain.  Additionally, the 
chapter discusses EPAA and identifies key stakeholders who will benefit from increased 
BMD ship readiness.  It is essential to understand the uniqueness and importance of the 
BMD and EPAA missions, the relevance of the threat, and AWS capabilities and 
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 limitations in order to understand the importance of overcoming and minimizing the last 
tactical mile. 
Chapter III describes previous solutions applied in Fifth and Seventh Fleets, 
which have mature logistics networks to support the BMD mission and ships against 
Iranian and North Korean threats.  Additionally, the chapter examines the logistics 
network that supports the primary mission of Trident submarines, which provide strategic 
and nuclear deterrence, a mission strategically similar to BMD’s. 
Chapter IV focuses on the optimization model used to determine the best location 
of BMD spare parts.  The model incorporates various constraints and variables to 
determine the optimal solution for pre-staging critical BMD parts. 
Finally, Chapter V presents recommendations and findings to decision-makers to 
improve and optimize BMD readiness in Sixth Fleet. 
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 II. BACKGROUND 
A. MISSION OVERVIEW 
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is the protection of the United States homeland, 
global allies, and forces stationed abroad against intercontinental, and also long-, 
medium-, and short-range missiles from nations with the capability and intent to use 
those weapons.  The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), a separate agency within the 
Department of Defense (DoD), manages and coordinates BMD efforts across all services 
to create a fully linked, integrated, and layered BMD system (BMDS).  As displayed in 
Figure 1, MDA, a research, development, and acquisition agency, coordinates Air Force 
space systems, Army ground-based interceptors (GBI), and Navy sea-based systems, 
while working closely with combatant commanders (COCOMs) to ensure that the BMDS 
supports their requirements.  
 
Figure 1.  Ballistic Missile Defense System Overview 
(from Missile Defense Agency [MDA], n.d.) 
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 B. IRANIAN THREAT 
Iran presents a determined threat to the United States and its North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in the Middle East and Europe.  Iran possesses 
deployable medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) that are inherently capable of 
carrying nuclear warheads and other weapons of mass destruction.  Iranian MRBMs have 
ranges up to 2,000 kilometers, which are in striking distance of Israel, Turkey, and 
Greece, as displayed in Figure 2 (Hildreth, 2012, p. 22).  Furthermore, intelligence 
assessments warn that Iran continues to pursue the development of intercontinental-range 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and could develop a weapon capable of reaching the United 
States homeland and its allies with foreign assistance (Hildreth, 2012, pp. 35–38). 
 
Figure 2.  Range of Iranian MRBM (from Hildreth, 2012, p. 22) 
 6 
 C. NAVY’S ROLE IN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
The Navy operates a variety of systems within the BMDS, but its main role is the 
application of sea-based sensors and sea-based engagement capability on AEGIS cruisers 
and destroyers.  The Navy’s BMD capability revolves around AWS employed on multi-
mission cruisers and destroyers.   
The Navy maintains 28 BMD-capable ships, five Ticonderoga-class guided 
missile cruisers (CG), and 23 Arleigh Burke–class guided missile destroyers (DDG), 
which regularly deploy to Pacific Command (PACOM), European Command (EUCOM), 
and Central Command (CENTCOM) Areas of Responsibility (AOR) to support 
COCOMs against evolving regional and global threats.  As ICBM technologies evolve 
and their ranges increase, COCOMs’ demand for BMD-capable AEGIS ships exceeds the 
available supply.  As former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead stated, 
“Ballistic missile defense is going to be a core mission in the United States Navy and we 
are seeing that capability and capacity in greater demand than we ever have before” 
(MDA, n.d., para. 1).  Under the proposed fiscal year (FY) 2014 budget, the number of 
BMD-capable ships is scheduled to grow to 41 ships by the end of FY2018. 
Of the 28 BMD-capable ships, 16 are homeported in the Pacific, including five 
forward-deployed naval forces (FDNF) in Yokosuka, Japan; five in Pearl Harbor, HI; and 
six in San Diego, CA (MDA, n.d.).  Additionally, 12 BMD ships are stationed in the 
Atlantic, with 10 in Norfolk, VA, and two in Mayport, FL.  As part of EPAA, the United 
States Navy will station four BMD destroyers in Rota, Spain, to support BMD 
requirements.  Additionally, the Navy will build and operate one AEGIS Ashore station 
in Romania and one in Poland to support BMD requirements in 2015 and 2018, 
respectively. 
1. AEGIS Weapon System Overview 
AWS is an integrated combat system developed to support multiple missions, 
including anti-air warfare (AAW) and BMD.  It consists of several integrated elements: 
AN/SPY-1D Phased Array Radar, MK-41 Vertical Launching System, MK-1 Weapon 
Control System, MK-1 Fire Control System, MK-1 Command and Decision System, 
AEGIS Display System, and MK-1 Operational Readiness Testing System.  All of the 
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 elements contribute to the successful operation of the system as a whole to complete its 
mission, primarily AAW and BMD. 
In addition to AWS, various communication and Tactical Digital Information 
Link systems are vital to the layered BMDS.  Army, Navy, Air Force, and allied units use 
extremely high frequency and super high frequency links and communication systems to 
pass track information, prompt different tracking sensors, and cue engagements. 
While AWS is a complex system, engineers designed multiple redundancies 
within each element of AWS to ensure maximum system readiness and eliminate a single 
point of failure within the system.  However, when operating in BMD mode, AEGIS 
cruisers and destroyers transmit a great deal of power through the AN/SPY-1D Phased 
Array Radar, which stresses the system and periodically requires the replacement of 
critical parts.  Therefore, a majority of AWS casualty reports (CASREPs) relate to the 
AN/SPY-1D, the sea-based sensor critical in the layered BMDS.  Due to the nature of the 
BMD mission and ramifications of its failure, AWS must operate continuously to support 
COCOM mission requirements.  Thus, critical parts and spares need to be on hand or 
readily accessible to minimize AWS downtime.   
2. Arleigh Burke Flight I and II Destroyers 
The four ships selected for forward deployment in Rota are Arleigh Burke–class 
destroyers.  USS Carney (DDG-64) and USS Ross (DDG-71) are classified as Flight I 
Arleigh Burke–class destroyers, and USS Donald Cook (DDG-75) and USS Porter 
(DDG-78) are classified as Flight II Arleigh Burke–class destroyers.  All four ships have 
similar AWS employed onboard and common AEGIS baselines configured for BMD, 
with minor AEGIS Combat System (ACS) differences.  Thus, all required AWS parts are 
interchangeable for BMD. 
Flight I and Flight II destroyers have the capacity to land and refuel helicopters 
but do not have the organic capability to deploy with an embarked helicopter detachment.  
Thus, Flight I and Flight II destroyers can only receive supplies from inorganic or shore-
based helicopters, from supply ships during an underway replenishment, or by pulling 
into port. 
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 3. Overview of BMD Casualty Reporting Procedures 
Any casualty or degradation to an individual AWS element can contribute to a 
degradation of the system as a whole.  Casualties that contribute to a minor degradation 
of a primary or secondary mission area are classified as category (CAT) 2 CASREPs, 
those that contribute to a major degradation of a mission area are classified as CAT 3 
CASREPs, and those that contribute to a loss of a mission area are classified as CAT 4 
CASREPs.   
D. EUROPEAN PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH 
The Obama Administration revealed a new strategy for European BMD on 
September 17, 2009, that incorporated a phased adaptive approach.  Each phase of the 
adaptive approach brings increased DoD ballistic defense capability to the European 
theater, which is collectively known as EPAA.  EPAA replaced the previous European 
missile defense program that called for a fixed interceptor site in Poland and a fixed radar 
site in the Czech Republic (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2011, p. 1). 
The new European regional approach to BMD requires AEGIS BMD ships, 
AEGIS shore-based sites, and upgraded land-based radar to protect European allies 
against short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats.  The phased approach also 
addresses future long-range missiles and other developing missile threats, particularly 
from Iran.  The MDA outlined the four phases specific to EPAA: 
• Phase I: Deploying existing AEGIS BMD ships with Standard Missile-3 
interceptors (SM-3 Block 1A) and a land-based radar (AN/TPY-2) in Europe 
by the end of 2011 (GAO, 2011, p. 4).  This phase was successfully completed 
on March 7, 2011, with the Mediterranean Sea deployment of an AEGIS 
BMD ship based out of Norfolk, VA, as part of EPAA. 
• Phase II: Field-enhanced capability to defend against short- and medium-
range ballistic missiles by including a land-based version of the AEGIS BMD 
weapon system in Romania with an upgraded SM-3 Block 1B interceptor by 
2015 (GAO, 2011, p. 4). 
• Phase III: Field-enhanced capability to defend against short- and medium-
range ballistic missiles by including an AEGIS Ashore in Poland with an 
advanced SM-3 Block IIA interceptor by 2018 (GAO, 2011, p. 4). 
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 • Phase IV: Field-enhanced capability to defend against longer range threats, 
including intercontinental ballistic missiles, by including an upgraded SM-3 
Block IIB interceptor (GAO, 2011, p. 4). 
On March 15, 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced significant 
changes to EPAA.  Due to program delays for the advanced SM-3 Block IIB interceptor 
and cuts in congressional funding, the DoD cancelled Phase IV of EPAA and reallocated 
the funds to enhance GBI programs.   
1. Forward-Deployed BMD AEGIS Assets in Rota, Spain 
 NATO, Spain, and the United States concurrently announced on October 5, 2011, 
that four BMD AEGIS destroyers would be forward deployed to the naval base in Rota, 
Spain, in support of EPAA.  The first two destroyers, USS Ross (DDG-71) and USS 
Donald Cook (DDG-75), will shift homeports to Rota in FY2014.  During FY2015, USS 
Carney (DDG-64) and USS Porter (DDG-78) will shift homeports to Rota.  Three of the 
four destroyers were originally homeported in Naval Station Norfolk, VA, and the fourth, 
USS Carney (DDG-75), was stationed out of Naval Station Mayport, FL. 
At least one BMD-capable AEGIS ship is committed to patrol the eastern 
Mediterranean Sea, where its BMD capabilities will be most effective.  Without a 
forward-stationed base in the European theater, approximately 10 BMD-capable ships 
would need to be in ready reserve from bases in Norfolk, VA, and Mayport, FL, to 
adequately cover the transit times and stationing requirements to fulfill EPAA 
(O’Rourke, 2013a, p. 60).  The four destroyers will have more expedient access to the 
eastern Mediterranean Sea should the need for more than one BMD-capable ship arise.  
The forward-deployed ships will also engage in joint operations with NATO allies in the 
region, including Standing NATO Maritime Groups, joint naval exercises, and maritime 
security cooperation functions (O’Rourke, 2013a, p. 56).   
2.  Key EPAA Stakeholders 
Several DoD departments and agencies play a vital role in BMD and EPAA 
development and execution.    
• Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics: Ensures the policy guidance and development of missile 
defense strategy for MDA, including broad procurement objectives.  The 
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 Under Secretary provides oversight for the funding plan for global BMD 
strategy. 
• Missile Defense Agency (MDA): The primary BMD stakeholder is the 
MDA, which holds a variety of responsibilities ranging from research and 
acquisition of BMD elements to oversight of BMD requirements.  MDA 
has a unique position regarding BMD development because it is exempted 
from the traditional requirements that other joint DoD agencies must abide 
by.  These exemptions allow MDA to apportion BMD resources as needed 
while working closely with COCOMs to address current and future 
threats.  
• EUCOM: The COCOM responsible for the European theater, including 
Turkey, Russia, and Israel, and the lead COCOM that executes and plans 
EPAA.  EUCOM utilizes its military service components to field the 
assets necessary to implement EPAA. 
• Sixth Fleet: The operational branch for U.S. Naval Forces Europe that 
conducts theater security cooperation missions and maritime operations in 
Europe.  Sixth Fleet works along with NATO, interservice, and 
interagency components to provide naval assets and resources to execute 
EPAA.  Assets provided by Sixth Fleet also include trained personnel and 
maintenance capability for combat systems. 
• Commander, Combined Task Force 63 (CTF 63): The logistics branch 
of Sixth Fleet that is responsible for supply support of naval assets afloat 
in Europe, including naval assets operating for EPAA.  CTF 63 is 
headquartered out of Naples, Italy, and consists of replenishment and 
repair ships that focus on delivering supplies and services at sea.  CTF 63 
is also responsible for procuring and tracking spare parts and supplies that 
are delivered to ships. 
• NATO: Member nations of NATO are responsible for coordinating 
multinational military defense in the European theater, including joint 
maritime security operations.  Member nations of NATO have a vested 
interested in the implementation of EPAA to counter regional threats such 
as Iran and Russia. 
3. Naval Support Facilities in Sixth Fleet 
Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet is based and headquartered in Naples, Italy, to 
support EUCOM.  However, many shore-based assets support ships deployed to the 
AOR.  Figure 3 identifies the locations of major Navy logistical hubs around the 




Figure 3.  Map of Naval Support Facilities in Sixth Fleet That Support BMD  
(after Google Earth, n.d.) 
• Naval Base Rota: The location of the naval base at Rota is crucial to the overall 
efficiency of EPAA.  Rota is located in the southwestern Atlantic coast of Spain 
along the bay of Cadiz, which is approximately 60 miles from the Strait of Gibraltar.  
Additional base infrastructure is being constructed to accommodate the four BMD-
capable ships along with increased facilities maintenance capabilities.  Naval Supply 
Systems Command (NAVSUP) fleet logistics center (FLC) Rota provides logistics 
and support services to ships.  NAVSUP FLC Rota also serves as the entry and exit 
point for material from the United States via the East Coast.   
• Naval Air Station (NAS) Sigonella: NAS Sigonella is located in eastern 
Sicily and provides administrative and logistical support to the United States 
and other NATO allies.  The central location of NAS Sigonella in the 
Mediterranean Sea gives it a strategic geographic advantage.  In January 2005, 
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) Sigonella (which became NAVSUP 
FLC Sigonella in 2011) was established to provide logistical support and 
procurement for forces operating in Sixth Fleet and is the main logistics hub 
in the Mediterranean theater.  NAVSUP FLC Sigonella and NAVSUP FLC 
Sigonella Detachment Naples are responsible for providing theater-wide 
logistics support, including the oversight of the logistic support centers 
located in Rota, Naples, and Souda Bay. 
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 • Naval Support Activity (NSA) Souda Bay: NSA Souda Bay is located in the 
northwest coast of Crete in the Greek isles.  NAVSUP FLC Souda Bay 
provides forward logistical support to the United States and other NATO 
allies operating in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. 
• Haifa, Israel: Located on the Mediterranean coast of Israel, Haifa is utilized 
as a port of call for U.S. and NATO ships operating in the eastern 
Mediterranean Sea.  Critical materiel and parts that are commercially shipped 
to ships in the eastern Mediterranean Sea often arrive in Israel. 
• Military Sealift Command (MSC): MSC assets that operate in Sixth Fleet 
typically include Kaiser-class supply ships that perform rotational duties in the 
Mediterranean Sea.  MSC assets provide underway replenishment capabilities, 
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 III. PREVIOUS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
AEGIS BMD ships regularly deploy to Fifth and Seventh Fleet AORs, and a 
robust logistics network exists to support their missions.  Additionally, Trident ballistic 
missile submarines fulfill a similar strategic mission. In this chapter, we briefly analyze 
the Trident System’s logistics support.  Finally, we examine Sixth Fleet’s current 
logistics network that supports BMD ships. 
A. SEVENTH FLEET 
Five AEGIS BMD ships are stationed in Yokosuka, Japan, as part of the FDNF to 
support the Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet against North Korean threats.  These ships 
include one cruiser, which serves as the BMD mission commander for Commander, 
Carrier Strike Group Five, in addition to four destroyers assigned to Commander, 
Destroyer Squadron Fifteen.  FDNF ships have regularly responded to BMD operations 
when tensions escalate with North Korea.  On April 5, 2009, USS Stethem (DDG 63), 
USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54), USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62), and USS Shiloh (CG 67) 
successfully tracked the North Korean Taepodong-2 missile fired over Japan (Roughead, 
2009, p. 6; Sang-Hun & Sanger, 2009).  Additionally, BMD ships stationed in Pearl 
Harbor, HI, and San Diego, CA, regularly deploy to Seventh Fleet to support BMD. 
 Logistically, a mature network, led by Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) 
Distribution Yokosuka and NAVSUP FLC Yokosuka, provides distribution support 
throughout the Western Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean.  It also provides logistics 
support to warships of the carrier strike group homeported in Yokosuka, the 
expeditionary strike group homeported in Sasebo, and U.S. naval vessels transiting the 
Seventh Fleet AOR (DLA, n.d.).   
In addition to a robust logistics network, FDNF ships have ready access to shore- 
and sea-based aircraft to transfer mission-critical BMD parts and minimize the downtime 
caused by the last tactical mile.  In addition to shore-based helicopters in Japan and South 
Korea, including Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) assets, Carrier Strike Group Five, 
Expeditionary Strike Group Seven, and multiple Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships 
regularly operate in theater and give BMD ships ready access to critical parts, if required.  
A unique aspect of the BMD mission is the partnership with the JSDF in the BMD 
mission area, because the Japanese operate BMD ships and shore-based assets of their 
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 own.  The JSFD agreed to support the U.S. BMD ships by transferring parts to U.S BMD 
ships at sea on JSDF helicopters and allowing U.S. helicopters to refuel at JSDF bases.   
B. FIFTH FLEET 
BMD ships regularly deploy to the Fifth Fleet AOR to support the Commander, 
Fifth Fleet and the Commander, CENTCOM against Iranian ballistic missile threats.  The 
Arabian Gulf is a smaller area than the eastern Mediterranean Sea or Pacific Ocean, and 
many shore- and sea-based assets operate regularly to support ships at sea.  NSA Bahrain 
serves as the central hub to deliver parts to ships throughout the Arabian Gulf.  
Additionally, DLA Distribution Bahrain and NAVSUP FLC Sigonella’s Bahrain 
Detachment support ships deployed to the Fifth Fleet AOR. 
Normally, a carrier strike group and multiple CLF ships operate in the Fifth Fleet 
AOR to provide helicopters to transfer critical parts to BMD ships underway.  Additionally, 
shore-based helicopters and other logistics aircraft are forward deployed in Bahrain to 
provide continuous logistics support in the Arabian Gulf.  Collectively, these minimize the 
last tactical mile to deliver critical parts to ships operating in the Arabian Gulf. 
C. TRIDENT SUBMARINES 
Ballistic missile submarines fulfill a similar mission to BMD AEGIS ships, and in 
this report, we briefly compare the different logistics networks that support two different 
assets with equally important missions.  The Navy operates four nuclear-powered cruise-
missile submarines (SSGNs) and 14 nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines 
(SSBNs) that perform a variety of missions.  SSGNs carry Tomahawk cruise missiles and 
provide covert strike capability for COCOMs; they do not carry nuclear weapons.   
SSBNs are armed with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which are 
large, long-range missiles armed with multiple nuclear warheads.  The SSBNs’ primary 
mission is to remain hidden at sea using their SLBMs to deter a nuclear attack on the 
United States by another country; this demonstrates to other countries that the United 
States has an assured second-strike capability against any nuclear attack (O’Rourke, 
2013b, p. 2).  SSBNs fulfill a vital mission forming one leg of the U.S. strategic nuclear 
deterrent force, which also includes land-based ICBMs and land-based long-range 
bombers (O’Rourke, 2013b, p. 2). 
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 SSGNs and SSBNs normally deploy for long periods of time, have limited space 
to store spare parts and supplies, and have limited access to sea- and shore-based logistics 
networks because they remain submerged to covertly conduct their mission.  While the 
Trident System deployed on SSGNs and SSBNs provides strategic offensive capability, 
the defensive capability that AEGIS BMD ships provide is equally important.   
To support SSGNs and SSBNs, Burke’s (2012) Logistics Support of the Trident 
System outlined specific requirements to sustain the strategic assets during their 
deployments.  Models used historical and predicted Trident program usage data to 
compute the shipboard allowance and load lists (Burke, 2012, p. 8).  This optimal 
coordinated shipboard allowance list (COSAL) is designed to ensure that an SSBN has 
enough replacement parts for preventative and corrective maintenance to perform its core 
mission for a period not to exceed 90 days.  As outlined in Logistics Support of the 
Trident System, the depth of the on-hand inventory of repair parts is provided to ensure 
• 99.99% average protection against probability of stock out for items that, if 
not available, would cause total missile launch degradation or termination of 
patrol;    
• 99% average protection against probability of stock out for items that, if not 
available, would partially degrade the missile launch capability; and    
• 90% average protection against probability of stock out for all other items 
(Burke, 2012). 
Thus, SSBNs and SSGNs are provisioned with enough parts to provide protection 
against the probability of stock out of the equivalent of CAT 3 and CAT 4 CASREPs to 
complete a mission up to 90 days in length.  A great deal of planning, research, and 
modeling goes into the COSAL planning to support the Trident System’s strategic 
mission.   
Furthermore, the DoD uses force/activity designators (F/AD) to define the relative 
importance of military forces and delineate a hierarchy of priorities used in supply 
requisitions (Loose, 2009, p. 6).  Assigned by the Secretary of Defense and Chairman, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, F/AD I designators are assigned to top national priorities and 
strategic systems.  Trident SSBNs are designated F/AD I, the highest designation, and 
SSGNs are designated F/AD II, the second highest designation (Burke, 2012, p. 13).   
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 Additionally, BMD ships, strategic assets with a critical mission comparable to SSBNs, 
are assigned F/AD I (Commander, CTF 63, 2013, p. 28). 
As strategic assets, should AEGIS BMD ships be equipped with enough COSAL 
to provide 99.99% and 99% protection against CAT 3 and CAT 4 CASREPs?  This 
report analyzes aspects of this problem through modeling to make recommendations to 
decision-makers.   
D. SIXTH FLEET 
BMD ships normally deploy independent of a carrier strike group to support the 
Commander, Sixth Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean Sea against Iranian MRBM threats.  
Navy ships have regularly deployed to the region, and a robust logistics network supports 
ships operating in the AOR.   
1. Combined Task Force 63 Roles and Responsibilities 
CTF 63 is responsible for “coordinating and providing transportation and delivery 
of personnel, equipment, fuel, supplies, repair parts, mail, and ammunition via air and 
surface logistics assets—including MSC combat logistics force ships—to sustain U.S. 
forces in the European and African theaters” (Henderson, 2013).  Realizing the 
importance of the BMD mission, CTF 63 (Commander, CTF 63, 2013) outlined a number 
of processes in its CTF 63 Logistics Handbook: Procedures for SIXTHFLT AOR to 
support BMD casualties.   
CTF 63 directs the movement of all BMD CASREP material and maintenance 
personnel to BMD ships in port and underway in the Mediterranean Sea.  Replacement 
parts for CAT 2 CASREPs are transferred in theater via commercial means or military 
aircraft (MILAIR) and delivered to the ship during port visits or replenishment-at-sea 
(RAS) evolutions by CLF.  CTF 63 explores additional means to quickly deliver CAT 3 
and CAT 4 CASREP material and maintenance personnel to BMD ships underway.  
Naval Air Station Sigonella serves as the primary logistics hub for Sixth Fleet, but BMD 
ships can also pick up parts in Souda Bay, Crete; Haifa, Israel; and Rota, Spain, during 
port visits. 
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 2. Logistics Overview 
Intra-theater transportation of air cargo is coordinated by CTF 63 after 
considering unit schedules and utilizing MILAIR, Air Mobility Command (AMC) 
channel services, and commercial air.  Air-shipped large cargo (over 300 pounds) sent 
to/from units operating within the AOR are normally transported to/from the continental 
United States (CONUS) by AMC airlift to/from naval air terminal (NAVAIRTERM) 
Rota, NAVAIRTERM Sigonella, or NAVAIRTERM Djibouti based on routing guidance 
contained in the cargo routing information file (Commander, CTF 63, 2013, p. 6). 
All Navy material shipments under 300 pounds are typically shipped via 
commercial shipper (e.g., FedEx, DHL, UPS).  In most cases, the material is shipped via 
one of the Navy’s logistics hubs—in Rota, Naples, Sigonella, Souda Bay, or Djibouti—as 
displayed in Figure 4—for further transfer to the ship via Navy transport.  In some cases, 
delivery directly to the ship can occur.  The Sixth Fleet AOR does not have vertical 
onboard delivery capability and has no organic helicopters assigned.  
 
Figure 4.  Sixth Fleet Logistics Hubs (from Commander, CTF 63, personal 
communication, 2013) 
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 3. BMD Casualty Reporting Procedures 
Recognizing the importance of the BMD mission, Sixth Fleet puts a high priority 
on speed and coordination in moving CAT 3 and 4 CASREP materiel to meet BMD ship 
emergent logistics and maintenance requirements.  CTF 63 coordinates with the Sixth 
Fleet maintenance officer in monitoring shipboard CASREPs and moving required repair 
parts and personnel to meet ship repair requirements. CTF 63 has specific procedures 
outlined in its CTF 63 Logistics Handbook: Procedures for SIXTHFLT AOR 
(Commander, CTF 63, 2013) to support BMD ships during increased BMD posture levels 
and CAT 3 and CAT 4 CASREPs.  Listed are the main contingency procedures CTF 63 
uses to support ships during BMD missions as described in CTF 63 Logistics Handbook: 
Procedures for SIXTHFLT AOR: 
• Shuttle CLF to the BMD operating area (OPAREA) to support and maximize 
scheduled underway replenishments (UNREPs) to receive parts and fuel to 
increase the ship’s endurance.  This is the primary delivery option when Sixth 
Fleet directs a BMD ship to remain on station and the ship does not have an 
embarked helicopter. 
• Transfer material from CONUS or DLA Distribution Sigonella to a 
commercial airport nearest the ship, and complete final delivery to the ship via 
CLF, the ship’s representative in port, the ship’s embarked helicopter, or a 
rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB) at sea.   
• Transfer the material via a Norfolk Ship Support Activity maintenance team 
member for hand-carrying on a commercial flight to a commercial airport 
nearest the ship, and complete final delivery to the ship via CLF, the ship’s 
representative in port, the ship’s embarked helicopter, or an RHIB at sea.   
Additionally, for BMD ships operating in the eastern Mediterranean, BMD 
material is sent through commercial channels to Tel Aviv, Israel, and transported to the 
unit during a port of call at Haifa, Israel.  BMD material shipped through military 
logistics capabilities is processed through MILAIR or AMC channels to Sigonella and 
then transferred via CLF ship to the unit or airlifted to NSA Souda Bay.  An overview of 
BMD logistics distribution processes is displayed in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.  BMD Logistics Process (from Commander, CTF 63, personal 
communication, 2013) 
4.  BMD Pack-Up Kits 
BMD pack-up kits (PUKs) originally consisted of 30–34 critical spares that were 
rotated between deploying BMD ships.  In 2011, NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support 
(WSS) determined that PUK parts should be placed on every BMD ship, regardless of 
deployment status.  As a result, a custom-made allowance parts list was developed for 
each ship’s COSAL.  Commander, Naval Surface Forces Atlantic closely monitors these 
parts and treats them as if they were a PUK, even though BMD ships do not transfer the 
parts among themselves. 
5.  Sixth Fleet Forward-Positioned BMD Parts 
Continuous BMD missions in the eastern Mediterranean created a need for 
forward-staged parts to accommodate high demand rates.  In 2011, NAVSUP Global 
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 Logistics Support (GLS) and WSS analyzed specific BMD national item identification 
numbers (NIINs) based on demand history, criticality of parts, CASREP requisitions, and 
operational availability (J. W. Camuso personal communication, July 19, 2013).  Based 
on the results of the analysis, a forward-positioned parts plan was constructed.  Three 
groups of parts were identified for forward-stock positioning in theater to support FDNF 
BMD ships: 
• BMD-specific parts: A collection of 270 NIINs specific to BMD shipboard 
systems was identified and subsequently positioned in theater at defense 
distribution depot Sigonella (DDSI; J. W. Camuso, personal communication, 
July 19, 2013).  DDSI personnel closely monitor the parts and inventory 
levels.  The demand from BMD ships in theater since the inception of the 
program has been moderately high. 
• BMD operational-level (O-level) parts: Parts that are not specifically used on 
BMD systems but are used to provide supplemental maintenance support to 
ship systems in Rota.  There are approximately 800–900 parts identified, but a 
validation process is still underway.  O-level parts are stocked at DDSI. 
• “Forward 8”: There are eight high-usage, high-dollar-value, critical 
BMD/SPY radar parts stationed in theater at DLA Distribution Sigonella for 
the specific use of Sixth Fleet ships.  NAVSUP WSS determined this 
requirement in late 2010 (J. W. Camuso, personal communication, July 19, 
2013).  The parts are managed by DDSI, and daily reports are submitted on 
the status of these critical parts to several Sixth Fleet entities.  The Forward 8 















Forward 8 Parts 
Nomenclature NSN NIIN Cost Location 
Electronic Switch 5840012584120 12584120 $226,967 DDSI 
Electronic Switch 5840012584121 12584121 $292,295 DDSI 
Filter, Radio Frequency 
Interference 5915014657505 14657505 $26,844 DDSI 
Rectifier Network 5965014657503 14657503 $118,433 DDSI 
Power Supply 6130012583679 12583679 $173,622 DDSI 
Inverter, Power 6130014657498 14657498 $104,863 DDSI 
Power Supply 6130014824403 14824403 $63,092 DDSI 
Simulator Group 6940012583671 12583671 $227,971 DDSI 
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 E. LONG-TERM BMD AEGIS COST CONSTRAINTS 
Many factors affect AEGIS supply readiness, including economic constraints that 
limit the supply side of part production in addition to the costs of pre-positioning assets. 
The balance between parts availability and operating under fiscal constraints must be 
analyzed to optimize readiness.  The reduction of available funds to support spare parts 
and parts availability has made it harder to achieve acceptable readiness levels. However, 
as critical spare parts become difficult to obtain, the ability to sustain BMD operations at 
sea becomes hindered.  In a cost-constrained environment, it is imperative to optimize 
supply funding, placement, and policies to maintain appropriate readiness levels.   
The regional, flexible approach to BMD, as in EPAA, encounters uncertain life-
cycle costs.  This uncertainty stems from the evolving approach of EPAA, which 
recognizes that a strategic approach does not have the same clear objectives and 
limitations as a detailed defense program.  Proper life-cycle cost calculations would show 
the impact on the supply chain and also all other costs, ranging from research and 
development, production, operations, and maintenance.  Even though the EPAA makes 
the future infrastructure and policies more predictable, sufficient cost-estimation models 
also exist to estimate costs and efficiently budget and appropriate funds for current and 
future use.  Without considering long-term cost estimations, supply sparing and BMD 
mission readiness in the Mediterranean Sea may be adversely impacted.  
F. SCOPE 
In developing a model to optimize BMD readiness, this report develops a 
mathematical approach to improve the current forward-staging of critical BMD spare 
parts.  This project places an emphasis on the Forward 8 critical spares that are located in 
Sigonella in order to minimize overall lead-times involved in getting these high-demand 
parts to operational BMD ships.  In this report, we analyze an optimum staging strategy 
that would maximize the operational readiness of BMD ships while they are on station in 
the eastern Mediterranean.   
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 IV. OPTIMIZATION MODEL 
The previous three chapters discussed the importance of analyzing the Forward 8 
parts to improve BMD readiness in Sixth Fleet.  This chapter focuses on the technique 
and model we used to optimize BMD logistics support for BMD ships operating in Sixth 
Fleet. 
A. DATA SOURCES 
1. Sixth Fleet CASREP Data  
We analyzed CAT 3 and 4 CASREP data from January 2011 through August 
2013 provided by CTF 63.  Evaluating all CGs, DDGs, and Oliver Hazard Perry–class 
frigates that deployed to the Sixth Fleet AOR, we derived the average transit time and 
customer wait time for ships to receive CAT 3 and 4 CASREP materials related to ship 
systems at a specific port.  Transit time is based on the transportation time a part takes to 
get from a shipping node to the ship.  Customer wait time incorporates transit time and 
the administrative processing time between when a requisition is placed to when it is 
sent.  The results are listed in Table 2.   
Table 2.   Consolidated CASREP Data From CTF 63. 
 Location CASREPS 
Average Transit 
Time (days) 
Average Customer Wait 
Time (days) 
All 1,132 9 13 
Rota, Spain 100 8 11 
Haifa, Israel 107 7 10 
Sigonella, Italy 403 10 15 
Limassol, Cyprus 10 9 12 
Souda Bay, Crete 259 6 8 
The data in Table 2 illustrate the time delay in routing mission-critical parts from 
logistics hubs to ships underway around the Mediterranean Sea.  We assumed all CAT 3 
and 4 materials are given equal shipping priority, and made no distinction between 
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 AEGIS BMD parts, AEGIS parts, and non-AEGIS parts (i.e., engineering materials).  
This provided us with a larger data set to evaluate overall transit times in the region rather 
than if we had focused solely on AEGIS parts.  Minimizing CASREP lead times is given 
the highest weight in the model as it directly relates to minimizing the last tactical mile to 
deliver critical parts to BMD ships. 
2. COMAIR Data 
To determine the availability of COMAIR in the AOR, we examined the 
frequency and proximity of commercial air transportation flights to Sixth Fleet logistics 
hubs.  We evaluated transportation data from FedEx and DHL commercial websites, as 
they are two of the primary companies that transfer materials for the Navy in the AOR.  
Additionally, we evaluated the distance from the COMAIR office to the military logistic 
hub using FedEx and DHL commercial websites. 
3. MILAIR Data 
To determine the availability of MILAIR, we contacted DESRON 60 and CTF 63 
staff members to determine to availability of military assets in the AOR.   
4. Proximity Data 
To determine the proximity data, we measured the distance between a logistics 
hub to the estimated OPAREA using Google Maps as displayed in Figure 4. 
B. LOGISTICS FACTORS 
We examined multiple logistics factors that contribute to the delivery time of 
CASREP material in Sixth Fleet.  Within the model, we quantified the efficiency of each 
logistics factor, including staging parts on the ship, in relation to specific logistic hubs.  
1. Access and Availability of Military Sealift Command (MSC) Assets 
CLF ships are a vital resource to transfer parts from a logistics hub to a ship 
underway.  Although transit times of a part generally increase when a CLF ship is used, 
the ability of the BMD ship to remain on-station has several mission-enhancing 
 26 
 advantages.  Each logistics hub is given a score based on the volume of outbound 
replenishments CLF ships conducted during the past two years from each port. 
2. Access and Availability of Military Aircraft (MILAIR) 
MILAIR is one method used to transport material throughout Sixth Fleet AOR 
and provides distinct advantages.  If a logistics hub with forward-staged parts has access 
to MILAIR, air transport times can be minimized. MILAIR also provides the only air 
transportation option to deliver material directly to a ship underway, which is imperative 
since BMD ships do not possess organic helicopters.  Most customs regulations from 
regional host nations are also bypassed when using MILAIR.  Each logistics hub is 
scored based on the quantity and type of MILAIR, such as fixed- and rotary- wing 
squadrons.  MILAIR factors also incorporate airfields on military installations as well as 
the volume of air traffic to other hubs in the region. 
3. Access and Availability of Commercial Aircraft 
COMAIR is widely used to expedite critical parts from logistics hubs to nearby 
ports ships can pull into. Often, COMAIR provide the shortest transit times.  Major 
carriers, such as FedEx and DHL, are used to transport parts using the most expedient 
service category available.  COMAIR benefits include frequent international transit 
routes and interactive features, such as online shipment tracking.  Access to COMAIR is 
evaluated based on the number of commercial flights per week by different major carriers 
near each logistics hub.  
4. Proximity to Operating Area 
Geographic proximity between a logistics hub and a ship is a crucial factor in 
evaluating lead times.  Typically, transit lead times are decreased the closer a logistics 
hub is to the OPAREA.  BMD missions are normally conducted in a general OPAREA in 
the eastern Mediterranean as displayed in Figure 4.  Logistics hubs are assigned scores 
based on their proximity to the OPAREA.   
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 5. Transferability of Parts 
Logistics hubs that have accessibility to several modes of transportation are vital 
if critical parts will be staged there.  Not only is it important to transfer parts from the 
logistics hub to the BMD ship, but it is equally important to have the capability to 
transfer parts from one logistics hub to another.  Demand will not always be from a BMD 
ship in the OPAREA as logistics hubs that maintain the inventory of parts must have the 
capacity and capability to transfer parts to other areas.  Transferability refers to the 
degree that forward-staged parts can move from one logistics hub to another.  Access to 
MILAIR, COMAIR, MSC assets, and military installations are factored into the 
transferability rating of a logistics hub.   
6. Demand   
Demand rates of Forward 8 parts were analyzed using the Web Visual Logistics 
Information Processing System to determine which logistics hubs received parts over a 
two-year period.  Scores for each logistics hub were assigned based on the quantity of 
parts received at that location. 
C.  METHODOLOGY 
This model is constructed as an integer program that addresses the optimal 
forward-staging locations of Forward 8 parts throughout Sixth Fleet.  After analyzing 
several variables using a Solver add-in, we constructed an optimization model in 
Microsoft Excel.  This model assigns scores to logistics hub and NIIN-specific categories 
that affect the last tactical mile of parts delivery.  Logistics hubs are given efficiency 
scores based on average CASREP part transit times and availability of MSC assets, 
COMMAIR, and MILAIR.  Proximity of the logistics hubs to the OPAREA and 
transferability of parts between hubs are also incorporated into this model.   Forward 8 
parts demand rates are analyzed for each hub.  Since CASREP lead time is used as a 
category, a low score is deemed as favorable and a high score is deemed as unfavorable.  
Lastly, weighted factors are assigned to each category to differentiate their relative 
importance. 
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 D. MODEL FORMULATION 
This section outlines the model formulation and all relevant indices, variables, 
and parameters. The objective function examines the combination of logistics categories, 
efficiency scores, and weighted factors that yield the lowest score.  Since the model 
allows users to change the weighting scheme according to relative importance, the 
objective function combines all the various scores, weights, and categories to produce 
one overall efficiency score for each location.  The objective function is minimized 
because lead times are used as a logistics factor and reduction of lead times are seen as a 
benefit.  Therefore, solutions with the lowest score will be the optimal solution.  The 
output of the entire model will select the optimal location for Forward 8 parts in Sixth 
Fleet to support BMD ships operating in the region based on minimized scores.  
Indices 
 i  NIIN part  
 j  logistics hub  
 e  efficiency score 








 CASw  = CASREP transit time weighted factor w 
 CASej = Average CASREP transit time efficiency score e at location j 
 MSCw = Availability of MSC assets weighted factor w 
 MSCej = Availability of MSC assets efficiency score e at location j 
 MILw = Availability of MILAIR weighted factor w 
 MILej = Availability of MILAR efficiency score e at location j 
 COMw = Availability of COMAIR weighted factor w 
 COMej = Availability of COMAIR efficiency score e at location j 
 PROXw = Proximity to OPAREA weighted factor w 
 PROXej = Proximity to OPAREA efficiency score e at location j 
 TRANSw = Transferability weighted factor w 
 TRANSej = Transferability efficiency score e at location j 
 DEMw = Demand weighted factor w 
 DEMeij = Demand efficiency score e of part i at location j 
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 E. FORMULATION 





The objective of this model (1) is to minimize the total weighted efficiency scores 
in order to select the optimum forward-staging location for all parts.  The components 
used to determine the total weighted efficiency scores include the average CASREP time 
for parts to arrive in each location, access to MSC assets, availability of MILAIR, 
accessibility and frequency of COMAIR transportation, proximity to the OPAREA, ease 
of transferring material between locations, and historical demand of parts from each 
location. 
Equation 1 is subject to: 
 
                                      
1 ≤ CASw, MSCw, MILw, COMw, PROXw, TRANSw, DEMw ≤ 5      (4) 
0 ≤ CASej, MSCej, MILej, COMej, PROXej, TRANSej, DEMeij ≤ 10      (5) 
  (2) 
  (3) 
  (1) 
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 Equation 2 ensures that the model places only one of each NIIN in a location to 
satisfy current inventory levels.  Equation 3 prevents more than one of the same NIIN 
being placed at the same location.  This constraint is placed in the event that inventory 
levels rise above current figures.  Equations 4 and 5 limit the weighting and scoring 
scheme.  
F. ASSUMPTIONS 
The following are the key assumptions in optimizing BMD readiness in Sixth 
Fleet in no particular order of importance.  First, the model assumes four BMD ships 
operating in the AOR and at least one BMD ship in the OPAREA conducting a BMD 
mission.  Additionally, none of these ships have organic helicopters onboard.  We assume 
MSC, COMAIR, and MILAIR operations and assets remain at their current posture 
levels.  Furthermore, we assume no customs delays and all ports and airports will remain 
open during increased BMD posture levels. 
The Forward 8 parts are utilized independent of each other, meaning they are 
equally critical to the system.  For example, the Power Supply (NIIN 12583679) does not 
require the Power Inverter (NIIN 14657498) to restore the system as parts are 
independently critical of each other.  Additionally, all Forward 8 parts must be stationed 
together. 
We assume all parts are available within the supply system with no backordered 
requisitions.  Finally, we assume transportation costs are negligible in the model because 
of the importance of the BMD mission and criticality of CAT 2, 3, or 4 CASREP 
materials. 
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 V. RESULTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter V discusses the results and limitations of our model, recommendations to 
improve AEGIS BMD logistics in Sixth Fleet, and our overall conclusions.  Additionally, 
we discuss our sensitivity analysis for variations on lead time and transferability.  
A. LOCATION OPTIMIZATION RESULTS 
1. Results for One of Each NIIN 
The current inventory levels of Forward 8 parts in Sixth Fleet are one of each 
NIIN.  Running the model under this assumption, Souda Bay is the optimal location to 
forward stage all of the Forward 8 parts.  Table 3 shows the results of the model and the 
corresponding minimization scores, in which the lowest score is the optimal solution. 
Table 3.   Minimization Score Results for Allocating One of Each NIIN 
Location Minimization Score 
Souda Bay, Greece 12.64 
Sigonella, Italy 18.57 
Rota, Spain 21.43 
Haifa, Israel 21.74 
Limassol, Cyprus 25.93 
Souda Bay has the lowest CASREP lead time and has access to both military 
installations and COMAIR capabilities.  With access to major transportation routes and 
proximity to the OPAREA, Souda Bay is the optimal solution for placement of the 
Forward 8 parts in the region. 
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 2. Results for Two Parts of Each NIIN 
Due to the high cost and low production of the Forward 8 parts, the most likely 
scenario is that only one part of each NIIN is forward staged.  However, under the 
assumption that two parts of each NIIN are available, the model indicates that parts 
should be forward staged in Souda Bay and Sigonella, as illustrated in Table 3.  With 
greater access to MILAIR and other logistics capabilities, Sigonella is centrally located 
and is the second optimal choice to forward stage parts. 
3. Results for Three Parts 
In the event three of each Forward 8 part becomes available, Table 3 indicates 
that Forward 8 parts should be positioned at Souda Bay, Sigonella, and Rota.  
Geographically, this option makes the most sense due to the coverage of the eastern, 
central, and western Mediterranean Sea.  Beginning in 2014, Rota will be the homeport 
of BMD ships operating in Sixth Fleet and would be the next likely forward-staging 
location if three parts are available. 
While the model indicates Rota would be the third optimal location to position a 
third set of parts, Rota has a slightly better score than Israel.  Israel offers an ideal 
location due to its proximity to the OPAREA, low average CASREP lead time, and 
access to COMAIR. 
4. Results for Four Parts 
If the Navy allocated four of every part from the Forward 8 list, a set of all the 
Forward 8 parts would be assigned to each ship rather than positioning the parts ashore.  
Stationing the parts on each ship would eliminate the last tactical mile as ships would 
have instant access to these critical repair parts.  Additionally, parts could be transferred 
between ships via RHIB or CLF as necessary.  However, the low-production rates and 
high cost to stage one of every Forward 8 part on the four DDGs make this the most 
expensive and least attainable option.  
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 B. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Each logistics category is given a specific weight based on the importance level 
given by the model user.  Table 4 shows the results of a sensitivity analysis that modifies 
the weight of each logistics category from low to high in order to examine the impact on 
the optimal location.  By changing the weighting scheme, while keeping efficiency scores 
constant, we determined which logistics categories, if any, have the greatest impact on 










Lead Time MSC MILAIR COMAIR Proximity 
Transfer-
ability Demand 
Low/High Weight 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 
Rota 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 
Sigonella 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 
Israel 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 3 2 4 4 4 
Souda Bay 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cyprus 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
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 In Table 4, we examined the sensitivity of each logistics factor by assigning it the 
lowest and highest weight (1 and 5) and listing the resulting rank.  For example, by 
assigning a low weight (1) to the first category, CASREP lead time, Souda Bay is ranked 
first and Cyprus is ranked last.  By assigning a high weight (5) to CASREP lead time, 
Souda Bay is still ranked first and Cyprus is ranked last. This statement can be applied to 
each category in Table 4. 
Even with changes to the weighting scheme, Souda Bay remains the optimal 
location to stage the Forward 8 parts.  Regardless of weight designation, Souda Bay 
emerges with the minimum score while keeping all efficiency scores constant.   Sigonella 
remains as the second optimal location across the majority of logistics factors, with the 
exception of transferability.  As transferability decreases in importance, Israel becomes 
the second optimal location while Sigonella becomes the tertiary option.  Due to the 
change in optimization order, transferability is the logistics category that carries the most 
influence when efficiency scores are kept constant. CASREP lead-time and demand for 
each NIIN have no direct impact on optimization outcomes based on changing weighting 
schemes.   
1. Variations on CASREP Lead Time 
In the following subsections, we analyze variations of two key logistics factors, 
CASREP lead time and transferability, for each location.  The results are displayed in 
Table 5 and Table 6.  We examined the variation of each efficiency score at each location 
by assigning it the lowest and highest scores (0 and 10) and keeping the weighting 
scheme constant.  For example, by assigning a low efficiency score (0) to the first 
category, CASREP lead time at Rota, Souda Bay is ranked first and Rota is ranked 
second.  By assigning a high efficiency score (10) to CASREP lead time at Rota, Souda 
Bay is still ranked first, but Rota is ranked fourth. This statement can be applied to each 
category to interpret Table 5 and Table 6.  Since our focus is to minimize the objective 
function, a low efficiency score is desirable and a high efficiency score is undesirable. 
Keeping the weighting scheme constant, the following analysis focuses on how 
changes to efficiency scores of each location impact the optimization results.  One of the 
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 most significant logistics categories affecting the optimization model is CASREP lead 
times.  Table 5 indicates how decreasing or increasing CASREP lead times for each 
location, but keeping all other factors constant, affects overall optimization order. 


















Low/High Score 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 
Rota 2 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 
Sigonella 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 
Israel 4 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 3 
Souda Bay 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Cyprus 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
The results in Table 5 indicate that improvement of average CASREP lead time to 
six days or less at Sigonella would make it the optimal location for the Forward 8 parts. 
With a CASREP lead-time average of more than 10 days, Sigonella has one of the 
longest lead times in the region and improvements to its lead times alone would make it 
the top site. 
 If average CASREP lead times at Souda Bay deteriorated to 10 days or more, 
Sigonella would again be the optimal location.  If CASREP lead times in Rota decreased 
from the current average of eight days to six days or less, Rota would be the second 
forward-staging location for Forward 8 parts.   
2. Variations on Transferability  
Transferability underscores three legs of the mobility triad: commercial airlift, 
military airlift, and military sealift.  Sensitivity analysis evaluates how the optimization 
model changes to varying transferability efficiency scores from each location.  Once a 
location establishes a logistics capacity, such as a military airfield, it is unlikely that its 
capability will diminish beyond use.  Therefore, this sensitivity analysis focuses only on 



















Low Score 0 0 0 0 0 
Rota 3 3 4 3 4 
Sigonella 2 2 3 2 2 
Israel 4 4 2 4 5 
Souda Bay 1 1 1 1 1 
Cyprus 5 5 5 5 3 
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 Souda Bay remains the optimal location to stage Forward 8 parts independent of 
changing transferability efficiency scores.  Improved access to COMAIR, MILAIR, and 
MSC assets would make Israel the second-best pre-positioning location in Sixth Fleet.  
Improving access to MILAIR includes the establishment of a fixed- and rotary- wing 
squadron along with access to a military airfield in Israel.  Improvements to COMAIR 
would include increased volume of commercial delivery flights and additional 
commercial shipping carriers opening routes to Israel.  MSC assets would have more 
logistical outbound replenishment trips from Israel. 
As displayed in Table 6, improving the transferability factors of Cyprus, keeping 
all other factors constant, improves Cyprus to a tertiary staging location.  Major MILAIR, 
COMAIR, and MSC asset logistics infrastructures or capabilities would have to be 
constructed or developed in order for Cyprus to achieve such an outcome. 
C. MODEL LIMITATIONS 
Producing a model that completely represents every aspect of Sixth Fleet and 
AEGIS BMD logistics is beyond the scope of this report.  However, there are a few 
changes that would enhance this model and result in a more complete and valuable 
product.  
First, Navy ships operate in a dynamic environment in which schedules often 
change to support emergent operations.  Logistics operations are often ad hoc to support 
the changing schedules and demand for critical parts.  Thus, while the data for the model 
are as accurate as possible, every CASREP and logistics scenario is unique based on the 
ship’s mission and schedule.  As in any model, more accurate information would lead to 
a more accurate model. 
Second, Navy ships have been conducting the BMD mission in the Mediterranean 
Sea since 2011 as part of EPAA.  Thus, only three years of data exist and more data 
would improve the accuracy of the model.  More data will become available as AEGIS 
BMD ships are forward deployed in Rota and continue to operate in the Mediterranean 
Sea. 
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 Additionally, the model does not include transportation cost considerations nor 
cost analysis for MSC assets, COMAIR, or MILAIR.  Due to the AEGIS BMD 
program’s designation as F/AD I and the importance of the BMD mission, we 
disregarded transportation costs.  If these costs became a limiting factor, we could 
incorporate them into the model in the future.   
Finally, the model does not exclusively focus on lead-time sensitivities or include 
cost considerations, as previously mentioned.  A multi-objective programming approach 
could be used to weigh different objectives on selecting a forward-staging location based 
on importance: minimizing total lead times or minimizing total cost.  Also, the weighted 
factor of each logistics category is subject to a user’s discretion.  This flexibility allows a 
user to add importance to certain parameters, but a future model could eliminate the 
weighted scheme in favor of inputs that are purely deterministic. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
By increasing access to MILAIR and MSC, BMD ships would have increased 
access to logistics hubs.  For example, a Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) of MH-
60Ss could be forward deployed to Souda Bay, Israel, or Cyprus during an increased 
BMD posture to decrease the last tactical mile and maximize the time a BMD ship 
remains on station.  While Flight I and II DDGs do not have the capability to deploy with 
organic helicopters, they could maneuver to the MH-60S’s maximum range, 420 NM, to 
receive the helicopter from a shore facility. 
Another option to decrease the last tactical mile to deliver critical parts to BMD 
ships on station in the eastern Mediterranean Sea would be to leverage NATO Allies’ 
assets.  While this option is operationally and politically complex, Sixth Fleet could 
coordinate with NATO aircraft or CLF to deliver parts to BMD ships on station.   
Finally, the demand for AEGIS parts will increase throughout the Fleet as the 
number of BMD ships is scheduled to increase and operational demand for BMD ships 
by COCOMs increases to meet emerging threats in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.  
Therefore, the supply of repair parts must increase to meet the demand.  Additionally, 
due to the time-critical nature of the BMD mission and its designation as an F/AD I 
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 program, the Navy should increase the supply and availability of AEGIS BMD parts 
throughout the Fleet in the supply system. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The model generated in this report optimizes the pre-positioning location of 
specific BMD parts based on factors and parameters used in the model.  So as to meet 
this objective, the model had to incorporate factors that would reflect real-world logistics 
dynamics in Sixth Fleet.  Consequently, this model examined a select number of 
commercial shipping companies, logistics hubs, and military transport capabilities to 
provide critical parts in response to demand from BMD ships operating in the region.  
Historical data were used to assess the demand frequency of each part and the overall 
CASREP lead times for each location. The incorporation of weighted factors allows the 
model user to add importance to particular logistics elements.  
Using sensitivity analysis to alter the weighting scheme, Souda Bay remains the 
optimal location to stage the Forward 8 parts followed by Sigonella.  Furthermore, 
keeping the weighting scheme constant and varying the efficiency scores for CASREP 
lead time and transferability, we determined Sigonella would be the optimal location if 
the CASREP lead time improved, followed by Souda Bay.  Furthermore, sensitivity 
analysis of all other logistics factors confirms Souda Bay as optimal location.  
Through our analysis and research we determined NAVSUP GLS and NAVSUP 
WSS clearly identified the critical parts needed to be forward deployed in theater in the 
Forward 8.  Additionally, Sixth Fleet and CTF 63 have reliable and proven procedures to 
deliver critical CAT 3 and 4 materials to BMD ships on station in the eastern 
Mediterranean Sea.  However, based on our model and research, we have identified 
options to improve the stationing and delivery methods for the Forward 8 parts in Sixth 
Fleet.   
The goal of this report was to find an optimal location to pre-position high-value, 
high-demand parts that are critical to BMD missions. This report shows that, after 
evaluating several logistics parameters, an optimal solution can be found.  In the event 
the inventory level of these parts increases, the model outlines the secondary and tertiary 
solutions to optimize pre-positioning.  
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